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THE ECONOMIES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: 
HOW DID THEY FARE AFTER THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE SOVIET UNION?
Introduction
Geographic  terms are  sometimes  less clear  than they  seem at  first  sight.  The term Europe,  for 
example, may refer to different areas. The European soccer competition and the Euro Songfestival include 
participants from countries located outside Europe (such as Israel). Another example is Turkey, which is a 
candidate-member country of the European Union even though nearly all its territory is located on the 
Asian  continent.  Obviously,  political,  economic,  and  cultural  borders  may  be  quite  different  from 
geographic borders. This is also true with regard to the Black Sea region. Six countries border the Black 
Sea: Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Turkey. The Charter of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC), however, has been signed by 11 member-states. In addition to the countries just 
mentioned,  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Moldova,  and  Greece  are  members  of  the  BSEC-pact. 
Furthermore, a number of countries have the status of observer at the BSEC, including Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, and Tunisia. From October 1999, the BSEC itself has the status of observer at the 
United Nations because the General Assembly adopted a resolution to that effect.
Geographically,  one may consider three of the five BSEC-countries without a Black Sea coast to 
belong to the Black Sea region. Moldova is located between Ukraine and Romania and nearly reaches the 
Black  Sea.  Greece  nearly  reaches  the  mouth  of  the  Bosporus  connecting  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean Sea. Armenia does not border the Black Sea, but is located not far away from it. The two 
other countries without a Black Sea coast, however, are located at other seas. Azerbeidzjan borders the 
Caspian Sea, whereas Albania is bounded by the Adriatic Sea. It seems artificial to consider these two 
countries part of the Black Sea region. If Albania is considered part of the region, the question arises why 
Macedonia and Yugoslavia would not  be considered part  of  the Black Sea region either.  Similarly,  if 
Azerbeidzjan is considered part of the Black Sea area, it is hard to understand why Iran and Iraq would 
not be part of the region. It goes without saying that the answers to these questions are political in nature. 
If  countries  conclude a treaty,  it  is  based on political  decisions that  may be unrelated to  geographic 
borders.  The possible enlargement of  the BSEC stresses this.  A number of  countries,  including Iran, 
Yugoslavia, Macedonia, and Uzbekistan have applied for BSEC membership.
The Black Sea region lies at the crossroads of major existing and future oil and gas transportation 
routes1. Traditionally, the region has well-developed trade relations. A common characteristic of all BSEC 
countries – including Greece – is their dependency on Russia for their energy supplies. Azerbeidzjan is 
the only net exporter of energy. The dependency on Russia for energy supplies can hardly be considered 
a binding economic element. Considering the economy of the Black Sea requires defining the region in 
 © M. Peter van der Hoek, 2002.
1 The BSEC goes back to 1992, when the then Turkish president Özal launched an initiative that initially resulted in the Bosporus 
Declaration of June 25, 1992. The period June 25, 1992 until March 10, 1994 - when the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat was 
established - is usually referred to as the formative stage. Next, two major steps were taken (the Bucharest Statement of June 30, 1995 and 
the Moscow Declaration of October 25, 1996) towards a legal charter. The BSEC heads of states or governments signed the BSEC charter 
at the Yalta summit on June 5, 1998. This charter came into force on May 1, 1999 marking the official inauguration of the organization of the 
BSEC.
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one way or another. It goes without saying that every definition is arbitrary and different definitions are 
conceivable.
One option is to take the BSEC-pact as a base. This would imply the inclusion of at least all BSEC 
member-states. However, this is a very diverse group of countries consisting of six former soviet republics 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia), three former East Bloc states (Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania),  a candidate member-state of the European Union (Turkey),  and a European 
Union member-state (Greece). Therefore, I have opted for a strictly geographic approach. In this article I 
will confine myself to countries that physically border the Black Sea. This is a smaller number of countries 
and, thus, a less diverse group. It consists of three former soviet republics (Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia), 
two former East Bloc states that are European Union candidate member-states (Bulgaria and Romania), 
and a candidate member-state of the European Union without a communist past, but that is largely located 
outside the European continent (Turkey).
Economic development in the 1990s
During the first  years following the collapse of  the Soviet  Union the former  communist  countries 
suffered from a transition depression and a (in some cases large) decrease of the economy. The other 
countries of the former East Bloc also went through a depression. Turkey is the only of those included in 
this article without a communist past. Thus, it did not suffer from a transition depression. In this section I 
will first present a concise overview of the economic developments in the 1990s per country. Then I will 
present a summary.
Georgia
With the exception of Russia, former soviet republics have an additional disadvantage relative to other 
countries of the former East Bloc. After the collapse of the Soviet Union they had to establish a new 
independent state and to build from scratch the public institutions belonging to an independent state. In 
addition, in the Caucasus several civil  wars were waged. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, for example, a civil war broke out in Georgia that lasted until 1994. The lack of social and 
political stability resulted in an enormous decrease of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by three-quarters in 
the  period  1990-1994  (see  Table  1).  Inflation  developed  into  hyperinflation  and  amounted  to  nearly 
19,000% in 1994. The average annual inflation rate in 1991-1994 amounted to over 5,700%. At the same 
time the exchange rate of the Georgian currency plummeted from 220 lari per dollar in 1992 to over 1.1 
million per dollar in 1994. In the late 1990s, however, the economy miraculously recovered with an annual 
GDP growth of 5.5% in the period 1995-2000. As a result of a tight monetary policy the inflation rate 
decreased to an annual average of 8.5% in the period 1997-2000. The infrastructure that was heavily 
damaged during the civil war, however, is an important obstacle for further economic development of the 
country. No data is available about unemployment. For 2001 and 2002 the projections are favorable: a 
real GDP growth of 4 and 6.5% respectively and an inflation rate of 6 and 4% respectively.
Table 1. Economic indicators for Georgia, 1990-2000.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth -11.1 -20.6 -44.8 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 11.4 11.3 2.9 3.0 2.0
Consumer price 
index (% change)
4.8 81.1 809.9 3125.7 18916.0 183.2 39.4 7.1 3.6 19.2 4.1
Exports of goods 
(USD m)
n/a n/a 267 457 381 356 372 230 191 238 372
Imports of goods n/a n/a 645 905 744 683 686 931 1045 586 898
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(USD m)
Current account 
balance (USD m) 
n/a n/a -319 -485 -446 -410 -295 -499 -543 -198 -166
Unemployment
External debt 
(USD bn)
n/a n/a 0.08 0.6 0.98 1.06 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.9
Exchange rate 
(Lari/USD)
n/a n/a 220 12280 1102300 1.25 1.26 1.30 1.39 2.02 1.98
Source: EIU, Country Report.
Ukraine
Like in the rest of the ruble zone hyperinflation occurred in the first years of Ukraine’s independence 
and rose to over 4,700% in 1993 (see Table 2). Inflation continued to be high, however, and still amounted 
to over 28% in 2000. The Ukrainian currency – after the abolishment of the initially ruble coupons, then the 
karbovanets, and from September 2, 1996 the hryvnia – depreciated sharply. The hryvnia’s exchange rate 
decreased from 1.83 per  dollar  at  the introduction  in  1996 to  5.44 per dollar  in 2000.  The transition 
depression  lasted  very  long  in  Ukraine.  In  1991,  the  year  in  which  the  Soviet-Union  collapsed,  the 
economy shrank by nearly 12%. Subsequently, economic growth was also negative throughout the period 
1992-1999. In 1999, the economy had shrunk by nearly two thirds. Positive economic growth did not occur 
before 2000 (5.4%). The unemployment rate increased from 5.6% in 1995 – for previous years no data is 
available  – to  over  11% in  1998.  Although the very  slow pace of  the  reforms is  a big  problem,  the 
projections for 2001 and 2002 are positive: a real GDP growth of 3.1 and 3.4% respectively, an inflation 
rate of 17.5 and 15% and an unemployment rate of 6.1 and 7.1% respectively.
Table. 2. Economic indicators for Ukraine, 1990-2000.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth n/a -11.9 -17.0 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 5.4
Consumer  price 
index (% change)
n/a 91 1310 4735 891 377 80.3 15.9 10.6 22.7 28.2
Exports  of  goods 
(USD bn)
n/a 7.3 6.0 12.8 13.9 14.2 15.5 15.4 13.7 13.2 15.5
Imports  of  goods 
(USD  bn)
n/a 10.0 5.5 15.3 16.5 16.95 19.8 19.6 16.3 12.95 15.3
Current  account 
balance (USD m) 
n/a n/a n/a -849 -1163 -1152 -1184 -1335 -1296 1658 1727
Unemployment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.6 7.6 8.9 11.3 n/a n/a
External debt 
(USD bn)
Exchange  ratea 
(HRN/USD)
n/a n/a n/a 0.045 0.33 1.47 1.83 1.86 2.45 4.13 5.44
Sources: EIU, Country Report; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
a The hryvna replaced the karbovanets on September 2nd 1996, at the rate of HRN 1:Krb 100000.
Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, GDP decreased in the period 1992-1996 by over 40%. In terms 
of GDP the economy of Russia (with a population of 150 million people) is now not much larger than the 
economy  of  the  Netherlands  (with  a  population  of  16  million  people).  Table  3  shows  that  after  the 
hyperinflation of over 1,350% in 1992 the inflation rate has decreased, but in 2000 it still amounted to over 
20%. During the last two years of the Soviet Union, economic growth was already negative, while Russia 
hardly experienced any positive economic growth after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only in three 
years since 1992 the Russian economy grew (with 0.9% in 1997, 3.2% in 1999, and 6.3% in 2000). The 
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positive growth of the past two years, however, seems mainly due to the increase in oil prices. Since 
Russia exports raw materials – including crude oil – the current account of the balance of payments still 
shows a surplus. The strong decline of imports – which nearly halved after the financial crisis of 1998 – 
also contributed to this surplus. The Russian ruble has lost nearly all its value. The exchange rate plunged 
from 220 per dollar in 1992 to over 28,000 per dollar in 2000. The official unemployment rate increased 
from less than 5% in 1992 to over 12% in 1999. The projections for 2001 and 2002 are favorable: real 
GDP growth of 4% in both years, an inflation rate of 18 and 14% respectively, and an unemployment rate 
of 9.7 and 9.5% respectively.
Table 3. Economic indicators for Russia, 1990-2000.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth -2.1 -12.9 -18.5 -12.0 -12.4 -4.2 -3.4 0.9 -4.9 3.2 6.3
Consumer price 
index (% change)
5.0 92.6 1354.0 880.0 307 197.4 47.6 14.6 27.8 85.8 20.6
Exports of goods 
(USD bn)
48.8a 53.2a 42.4a 44.9a 51.6a 82.7 90.6 89.0 74.9 75.3 99.2
Imports of goods 
(USD bn)
50.2a 44.4a 35.0a 35.4a 37.7a 62.2 67.6 71.6 57.8 39.5 46.0
Current account 
balance (USD bn) 
-4.5 5.7 4.2 6.2 4.8 7.8 12.45 2.5 1.0 24.97 40.6
Unemployment 
rate (%)
n/a n/a 4.9 5.5 7.5 8.5 9.6 10.8 11.9 12.6 n/a
External debt 
(USD bn)
59.8 67.5 78.7 83.1 92.9 120.4 124.9 126.0 183.6 174.3 160.4
Exchange rateb 
(Rb/USD)
16 30 220 932 2204 4559 5121 5785 9705 24620 28240
Source: EIU, Country Report.
a Trade with countries outside the former Soviet Union only.
b Informal market rate in 1990-91.
Bulgaria
In the early 1990s, the Bulgarian government showed a half-hearted attitude as to reforms. As a 
result, the Bulgarian economy adjusted in a very slow pace to the changed circumstances. In the period 
1990-1993 the Bulgarian economy shrank by over one quarter.  This was coupled to a deficit  on the 
current  account  of  the  balance  of  payments.  The  Bulgarian  currency  sharply  depreciated,  while  the 
unemployment rate strongly increased. After a slight positive economic growth in 1994 and 1995, the 
economic crisis worsened with a negative economic growth of over 10% followed by a further contraction 
of 7% in 1997 (see Table 4). In that year, the Bulgarian economy faced hyperinflation (the consumer price 
index  rose  by  nearly  1,100%).  In  March  1997,  however,  the  Bulgarian  government  concluded  an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund on stabilization and reform program. Its most important 
element was the establishment of a currency board that had to defend the fixed exchange rate of 1,000 
lev  per  Deutschemark.  This  policy  was not  unsuccessful.  In  the  period  1998-2000,  economic  growth 
amounted  to  an  annual  average of  3.6%,  while  the  inflation  rate  was limited  to  an average of  11% 
annually. The official unemployment rate had increased from less than 2% in 1990 to a high of over 16% 
in 1993. In 1997, the official unemployment rate still amounted to nearly 14%. An important event occurred 
in  Helsinki  in  December  1999,  when  Bulgaria  was  invited  to  begin  talks  about  its  accession  to  the 
European Union. The projections for 2001 and 2002 are fairly favorable: a real GDP growth of 4 and 3.8% 
respectively  and an inflation  rate  of  8.5  and 4.3% respectively.  The unemployment  rate,  however,  is 
projected to levels of 17.4 and 15.6% respectively.
Table 4. Economic indicators for Bulgaria, 1990-2000.
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth -9.3 -13.8 -5.7 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 2.4 5.0
Consumer price 
index (% change)
21.6 334.0 89.1 72.8 96.2 62.0 123.1 1082.3 22.2 0.4 10.4
Exports of goods
(USD bn)
2.5 3.7 5.1 3.7 3.9 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.0 4.7
Imports of goods 
(USD bn)
3.3 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.0 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.9
Current account 
balance (USD bn) 
-1.2 -0.9 -0.3 -1.0 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.4 -0.06 -0.7 -0.6
Unemployment 1.7 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.4 11.1 12.5 13.7 n/a n/a n/a
External debt (USD 
bn)
10.9 12.0 12.2 12.9 11.1 10.9 10.1 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.4
Exchange rate 
(Lev/USD)
2.4 18.4 23.3 27.6 54.2 67.1 178 1682 1760 1836 2123
Sources: EIU, Country Report; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Romania
In the early 1990s, the Romanian government adopted a strategy of gradual reforms. GDP decreased 
with one quarter in the period 1990-1992 and the inflation rate increased to over 200% in 1993. In the 
years 1993-1996, an economic recovery followed with economic growth of over 4%, but this proved to be 
unsustainable.  Restructuring  the  heavy  industry  was  postponed  and  as  a  result  the  imports  of  raw 
materials and energy continued to be high. The current account of the balance of payments deteriorated 
and in one decade the Romanian currency lost nearly all its value (the exchange rate plunged from nearly 
22 lei per dollar in 1990 to almost 22,000 lei per dollar in 2000). The official unemployment rate rose from 
3% in 1991 to over 10% in 1993 and continued to be high in the rest of the 1990s. In 1999, the official 
unemployment rate still amounted to over 11%. The 1990s are characterized by a stop-go policy. After the 
gradual approach of the early 1990s, the government adopted in 1997 a shock therapy, resulting in a 
negative economic growth in the period 1997-1999 of nearly 4% annually. In 2000, GDP grew with 2%, 
but the inflation rate was still high (46%). Like Bulgaria, Romania was invited in 1999 to begin negotiations 
about its accession to the European Union. The projections for 2001 and 2002 are fairly positive: real 
growth of  GDP increases  to  3  and 3.5% respectively  and the  inflation  rate  declines  to  34  and 25% 
respectively, but the unemployment rate continues to be high at 11.6 and 11.9% respectively.
Table 5. Economic indicators for Romania, 1990-2000.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth - 5.6 - 12.9 - 8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 - 6.9 - 5.4 - 3.2 2.0
Consumer price 
index (% change)
5.1 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7
Exports of goods 
(USD m)
5775 4266 4363 4892 6151 7910 8085 8431 8302 8503 11240
Imports of goods 
(USD m)
9203 5372 5784 6020 6562 9487 10555 10411 10927 9595 11941
Current account 
balance (USD m) 
-3337 -1012 -1564 -1174 -428 -1774 -2571 -2137 -2968 -1288 -1446
Unemployment) N/a 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.9 10.3 11.5 n/a
External debt 
(USD m)
230 1143 2479 3357 4597 5482 7209 8584 9308 8436 9300
Exchange rate 
(Lei/USD)
22.4 76.4 308 760 1655 2033 3083 7168 8875 15333 21830
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Source: EIU, Country Report; National Bank of Romania, Annual Reports.
Turkey
Turkey is the only country bordering the Black Sea without a communist past. Thus, it did not go 
through a transition depression. Table 6 displays that the Turkish economy shrank only in1994 and 1999 
(by 5.4 and 4.7% respectively), but the projection for 2001 also shows a decrease. In all  other years 
economic growth was high and amounted to an average of over 6% annually. However, the inflation rate 
was also high and was never below 60% in the past decade. The exchange rate decreased very strongly 
from 2,600 lira per dollar in 1990 to nearly 419,000 per dollar in 1999. The official unemployment rate 
ranged from 5.8 to 8.4% and amounted on average to over 7 per annually in the period 1990-1998. In 
early  1998,  the  Turkish  government  launched  a  3-year  stabilization  program aiming  at  reducing  the 
inflation rate to below 10% at the end of 2001. The earthquake of 1999, however, also damaged the 
economy in a period in which the Turkish economy already faced the detrimental consequences of the 
Russian crisis of 1998. It is already clear that the stabilization program will not succeed in reducing the 
high budget deficit and the high interest rates and cannot temper expectations with regard to inflation.
Table 6. Economic indicators for Turkey, 1990-2000.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth 9.3 0.9 5.9 8.1 -5.4 7.1 7.0 7.6 2.8 -4.7 n/a
Consumer price 
index (% change)
61.7 65.45 70.33 66.45 106.2 87.96 80.3 85.8 84.62 64.86 n/a
Exports of goods 
(USD m)
13026 13667 14891 15611 18390 21975 32446 32631 31220 29326 n/a
Imports of goods 
(USD m)
22581 21007 23081 29771 22606 35187 43028 48029 45440 39773 n/a
Current account 
balance (USD m) 
-2625 250 -974 -6433 2631 -2338 -2437 -2679 1984 -1364 n/a
Unemployment 7.5 8.4 8.0 8.0 7.6 6.6 5.8 6.9 6.2 n/a n/a
External debt 
(USD m)
61703 104809 177697 311299 903477 1421166 2453 6593 n/a n/a n/a
Exchange rate 
(Lira/USD)
2609 4172 6872 10985 29609 45845 81405 151865 260724 418783 n/a
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Economic development in the Black Sea countries have been very diverse. The three former soviet 
republics suffered from a deep and long transition depression with hyperinflation, very high unemployment 
rates, and a very large decline of GDP. However, as a result of the notorious allocative inefficiency of the 
soviet economy a decrease of GDP in the area of the former Soviet Union is not identical to a decline of 
the standard of living. A decrease of the production of weapons and barbed wire does not necessarily 
imply a decrease of the standard of living of the population. However, the former soviet republics seem to 
have bottomed out. For Georgia this was already true in 1995, after the end of the civil  war in 1994. 
Notable seems that Georgia did not suffer from the financial crisis in Russia in 1998. This stresses the 
significance of  a good social  and financial  policy  and institutional  capacity  building towards a market 
economy. The Russian financial crisis of 1998 may have delayed the economic recovery in Russia and 
other Black Sea countries. The Russian economy seems to be growing from 1999 and Ukraine seems to 
have bottomed out in 2000. The two former East Bloc states also suffered from a transition depression 
with very high inflation and unemployment levels. Bulgaria seemed to recover as early as in 1994, but 
suffered from a backlash in 1996 and 1997. From 1998, however, this country seems to be on track to 
economic recovery. In Romania GDP grew in the period 1993-1996, but decreased in 1997-1999. In 2000 
economic  growth  was  positive  again  and  the  transition  depression  seems  to  have  bottomed  out  in 
Romania in 2000. Turkey does not carry the burden of the communist past. With few exceptions (1994, 1999, 
and probably 2001) it  enjoyed positive economic growth. Inflation was high, but did not take the form of 
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hyperinflation. The official unemployment rate was high, but considerably lower than in the former communist 
countries and also somewhat lower than in the European Union.
Prospects
One  may mention  a  number  of  positive  points  about  the  Black  Sea  region.  Traditionally,  it  has 
important trade relations and people are used to international traffic. The climate is very good. The labor 
force is fairly well educated and the wage costs are low. Yet, it is too simple to foresee sunny future. In the 
former  soviet  republics  and  East  Bloc  states  the  depression  seems  to  have  bottomed  out  and  the 
projections for economic developments in 2001 and 2002 are favorable. However, this does not guarantee 
a sustainable favorable economic development. Besides the positives there are also negatives.
First, the infrastructure is very poor. Good climate is not a sufficient condition for a thriving tourist 
industry. Tourists should be able to travel to the region easily and comfortably. Airports in the region do 
not meet the standards for mass tourism. In addition, visa requirements make it more complicated and 
more expensive for tourists to travel to the Black Sea region. The region’s traffic infrastructure is also poor. 
Most annoying to tourists is that the price/quality ratio of hotels in the region is absurd. The hotels offer 
Eastern  European  quality,  but  they  charge  western prices.  This  has most  likely  to  do  with  wavering 
methods of  privatization. Companies such as hotels  are leased for relatively short  periods (often five 
years). The government thus retains the ownership, while the entrepreneur will have a time horizon of five 
years at the most. This is too short  a period to take significant entrepreneurial  risks and to invest  on a 
significant scale. As a result, hotels are more or less cannibalized. The entrepreneur exploits them as they are 
without making any investments. Serious renovations are badly needed, but are not undertaken because the 
returns on these investments are too low in a period of five years.
Second,  corruption  is  a  big  problem in  the  whole  Black  Sea  region.  Transparency  International 
publishes a corruption perception index for a large number of countries on an annual basis. The corruption 
perception index indicates the extent of corruption in a country1. It ranges from 10 (very clean) to 0 (very 
corrupt). The corruption perception index for 2000 lists 123 countries. Since a number of them take joint 
places the list has 90 places. Finland is on the top of the list with a score of 10.0, whereas Nigeria with an 
index of 1.2 is at the bottom of the list. Georgia is not included, but its score would undoubtedly be low. 
Georgian enterprises spend 8.1% of  their  turnover  on bribes,  which is  the highest  percentage in  the 
region2. All former soviet republics and East Bloc states score very low. Ukraine scores 1.5 and takes the 
87th place. Russia scores 2.1 and is listed as No. 82. Romania has an index of 2.9 and takes the 68 th 
place; Bulgaria has a score of 3.5 and takes the 52nd place. Finally, Turkey scores 3.8 and is listed No.50. 
Notably,  the  extent  of  corruption  in  a  country  seems to  be correlated  to  the  economic  performance. 
Countries with a relatively favorable economic development tend to couple that to a relatively low extent of 
corruption.
Third, the building up of a social, economic and legal infrastructure is far from completed. Ownership 
cannot always be determined with certainty because property registries – insofar they exist - are unreliable 
and incomplete. This seems to be associated with the extent of corruption. Insofar taxes are collected, it 
does not always occur in a regular way. Moreover, licenses are not always issued in a proper way. Private 
investments are therefore discouraged, since extra risks related to corruption are added to the normal 
entrepreneurial risks. This increases the amount of uncertainty that companies face, which is detrimental 
for the investment climate.
Fourth, the negotiations of the three applicant countries with the European Union can take a very long 
time. Reference can be made to the 1980s, when the negotiations about the accession of Spain and 
Portugal lasted nine years. The progress reports of the European Commission – the most recent reports 
were published in November 2000 - make clear that a lot has still  to be done before the Central and 
Eastern European applicant countries can join the European Union. The European Commission refers 
explicitly  to  the  corruption  problem.  It  does  not  seem likely  that  Bulgaria  and  Romania  can  join  the 
European Union in 2007, while Turkey will have to wait considerably longer for its accession because of 
the human rights situation and the position of Greece and Cyprus.
1 Annual overviews are published on the Internet [www.transparency.de].
2 Joel Hellman and Mark Schankerman, Intervention, corruption and capture: the nexus between enterprises and the state, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 58, October 2000, p. 18.
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Conclusions
In this paper I confine myself to those countries bordering the Black Sea. Like any definition this 
definition of the Black Sea region is arbitrary. Of the three former soviet republics bordering the Black Sea, 
Georgia  showed  the  best  economic  performance,  in  particular  in  the  late  1990s.  The  economic 
performance of Russia and Ukraine is poor. Their economies shrank severely in the 1990s. Though the 
transition depression seems to have bottomed out, it is far from certain that the economic recovery is 
sustainable. The Russian economy might still have been shrinking without the support of high oil prices. 
Of  the  European  Union  candidate  member-countries  bordering  the  Black  Sea  Bulgaria’s  economic 
performance  is  considerably  better  than  Romania’s.  However,  the  high  unemployment  rates  and  the 
corruption problem still  pose big problems in both countries.  They will  have a long way to go before 
accession to the European Union can be realized.  Turkey combined high economic growth with high 
inflation  in  the  1990s.  The  stabilization  program does  not  meet  its  objectives  and  accession  to  the 
European Union is still far away.
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